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Hutcheson, Church and Stoicism: Politeness as
Moral Education for a Commercial Polity
Toshio Tsunoda
After the union with England in 1707 which deprived Scotland of its
politicalindependence Scots tried to find a new patriotic expression in
the improvement of learning, commerce and moral virtue. Edinburgh
was now aptly called the Athens of the North: the citizens there would
emulate the English not in the pursuit of political and military power
but in polite culture. The patriotic leaders of Scottish society were
intellectuals in such cultural institutions as universities, churches and
clubs. They were committed to the cause of politeness which consisted
in refined sensibility and manners through free conversation. The ideal
of moderation and self-restraint which politeness entailed was derived
from the Stoic tradition in Ciceronian humanism; they found in the
tradition an explanation of virtue improved through culture." In their
view human nature has sociability which encourages men and women
to improve their moral self-discipline through the social intercourse and
spectatorial approval and disapproval of each other's behaviour.
Moreover the tradition had an concept of the universal order of justice
by which it could be connected with natural jurisprudence taught in
Scottish universities as an essential subject for individuals in a
commercial polity. Stoic virtue and natural sociability were naturally
opposed to Augstinianism of the orthodox dogmas of the Presbyterian
Church of Scotland.
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Francis Hutcheson was a leading professor of moral philosophy in
the 1730s and 40s. I want to examine his moral philosophy as moral
education for the practical purposes of Scottish society which I have
observed briefly above. Sher's standard study of Scottish church and
university makes clear how Hutcheson's moral ideas of Christian
Stoicism shaped the outlook of the next generation of moderate literati,
such as Robertson, Ferguson and so on.2) This essay will discuss two
main points about Hutcheson's moral teaching in his Glasgow period.
First, I will put his synthesis of Christian religion and Stoic morals in a
historical context of three social forces: the state, the church and polite
culture. The church seems to have been faced with, and obliged to
comply with, the challenges of the state and polite culture. I will try to
re-create Hutcheson's context by describing the contemporary issue of
church patronage and several Scottish thinkers for and against
Hutcheson's teaching of virtue. Second, I will read his moral psychology
as his attempt to reconstitute the Stoic tradition of self-control for a
modern commercial society. His explanation of human moral perception
and virtue was underpinned by his analysis of the passions of men in
social relations. So I will see how Stoic independence was achieved
through sociable sensibilityin his account. In his plan of Stoic education
the concept of politeness included not only external observance of
duties and laws but also virtues of internal benevolent affections.
The revolution of 1688-89 abolished the episcopacy and reestablished
the Presbyterian government in the Church of Scotland, and the union
of 1707 guaranteed the independence of this national system, but this
church established by law was never secure or stable. The relation of
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the British state and this church and that of an emergent civil society
and the church still remained to be settled. The patronage debates
during the 1730s and 40s show this instability of the church. In 1690,
with church patronage of the crown and nobility abolished, elders and
heritors had the right to elect a minister in a country parish. Though
this arrangement was secured by the act for securing the Protestant
religion and Presbyterian church-government passed with the Union
Treaty, the Tories back in power revived patronage to annoy Whigs
and Presbyterians in 1712. As liberty of Presbyterian church was a
sensitive issue for Scottish national sentiment, the General Assembly of
the Church of Scotland protested against the patronage acts as
destroying 'the ancient Constitution of Scotland'.3' Patrons did not
exercise their patronage for a while, but in the late 1720s they began
to enforce it systematically. Thus the patronage problem was debated
as a vital issue related to the church polity.41Sher and Murdoch classify
criticisms of patronage into three types.5' The most radical and
democratic type originating in Knox's The First Book of Discipline
decided that all the men in a congragation should have votes to elect a
minister. The second type originating in Melville's The Second Book of
Discipline and realized in the 1640 act gave votes to presbyteries and
kirk sessions. The third type argued that local landed gentlemen as
heritors should lead a minister's election and this alternative had a
precedent in the 1690 act and was an application of Revolution Whig
ideology against court patronage and influence.
While the first and second positions were held by seceders and
some local reculcitrant presbyteries, leading moderate churchmen took
the third and the General Assembly's act of 1732 was of this type. So
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the leaders of the church were opposed to the crown patronage, and at
the same time they were advocating lay leadership of country
gentlemen against clericalism of the first and second Presbyterian
tradition. It seems that the patronage dabate was concerned not so
much about the independence of the Scottish church as about
government within the church. The 1730s saw the publication of quite
a few pamphlets, whose arguments were mainly based on the Bible and
ecclesiastical history. Some pamphleteers justified the patronage act by
arguing the supremacy of the legislature over the church: 'our
church-constitution is confirmed by civil laws.'6' Some rejected the
popular votes in favour of lay heritors' leadership because the
nomination of ministers was not 'spiritual matters' but 'temporal
concerns'71. Others rejected 'Levelling Doctrine' to keep the church
control and order; 'the private Judgment of Discretion, which the people
have, is to be guided by the publick Judgment of the Church-Repre-
sentative'81.These views were all modern and secular in that they
pitted the state, polite society or the moderate leadership against
fundamentalist tendency to make each private spirit absolute by the
divine inspiration.
On the other hand the secular state and the General Assembly
seemed to critics of the first and second types to be inimical to the
independent rights of the church and the people respectively. One
pamphleteer called defenders of patronage 'our modern Presbyterian
Disputants, our Erastian Presbyterians'; patronage was the state's
encroachment of the church's right of election of its ministers.9'One of
the most conspicuous opponents of patronage and church leaders was
Ebenezer Erskine (1680-1754), who followed the Covenanters' radical
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tradition and denounced the General Assembly's policy of compromise
in 1732, seceding from the church. He belonged to the first type of
critics of patronage; in his view a heritor was a 'man with the gold ring
and the gay clothing' and the authority of the General Assembly
dominated by a prevailing party could not be superior to the consent of
the congregation.101 He supported the British state and legislature, and
his opposition was directed to a party of the church which put a
merely human authority above the divine authority and private
judgement.111 While in Presbyterian polity the people should be
represented through kirk-sessions, presbyteries, synods and the General
Assembly, the Assembly acted against the popular mind12'; this was
tyranny for him. We find in him the national tradition of the previous
century still surviving as he urged 'the Obligations these Lands are
under to promote Reformation, by our Covenants National and Solemn
League'13*. The moderate and liberal trend among the intellectuals in
the Scottish church and university was anathema to him; 'a refined
System of natural Religion' was depravity from the Westminster
Confession and he demanded prosecution of John Simson (1668-1740),
Archibald Campbell (ob. 1756), Robert Wallace (1696-1771)14'. Erskine's
concepts of popular consent and private judgement were subject to the
absolute divine authority, so I should say that they need to be
transformed into independent principles, with human faculty of moral
perception examined, before they can be a creative principle of
democracy.
It was not the divine prescription but the human utilitythat guided
Hutcheson in choosing church government, so any particular form
should not be enforced but toleration was the consequence of his
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guiding principle. He remarked: 'I do not imagine that either [church]
government or externals of worship are so determined in the Gospel as
to oblige men to one particular way in either; [so] that all societies
may, according to their own prudence choose... as they think will do
most good, to promote the true need of all real piety and virtue, but
without any right of forcing others into it....'151He seems to have
brought a new factor, that is, a provincial society with polite culture,
into the patronage debate where people had discussed in terms of
relations of church and state. While his critique of patronage, as Sher
and Murdoch interpret, was the third type in the above classification as
he expected 'Gentlemen in the Country' to oppose 'Court Interest', he
was also critical of popular and zealous ministers 'of little Learning,
Sense, or Moderation'16', encouraging polite gentlemen to instill polite
culture into the church. I may suggest his expectation that politeness
of provincial gentlemen would produce public opinion critical both of
the state authority and of fanaticism of bigoted highflyers in the
church.
The language of politeness was originally associated with the royal
court and in fact I notice a pamphleteer for court patronage making
use of the language of politeness. His view was similar to Moderatism
in the late eighteenth century; he argued that the court was exercizing
patronage prudently consulting 'the heritors, gentlemen, who for the
most part had university education, or are taught the rules of
politeness, and by their frequent conversation with men of learning
know a great more, so must be allowed to be able to make a better
choice, than country clowns.'171 Besides remarking the church's
dependence on the civil power, he represented the critics of patronage
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as opponents of polite religion. His concern was that unnecessary
discord due to the patronage issue was encouraging atheism and deism
whereas Christianity alone could produce the foundation for sociability
and civic education. He referred to 'A Polite Author, writing in Defence
of Christianity', saying, 'The temper of a religion is,...an argument for
or against it'.18)Prevalent forms of Christian Stoicism represented
Christianity as a comprehensive true religion which assured the natural
order for social morality. Politeness and patronage could combine
against Presbyterian sectarian enthusiasm. Hutcheson seemingly
intended to create polite culture independent of the court so that he
might criticize both patronage and intolerant bigotry. His critique of
patronage is interpreted as proclaiming Scottish nationalism against the
Metropolis and as an application of Commonwealthmen ideology19'. I
admit that it had these aspects, but here I want to notice his advocacy
of polite culture which would replace patronage as a control over the
church. In the previous century of religious wars people struggled to
settle the relation of church and state, but it seems that, discussing
religious and political issues in the eighteenth century, people had to
consider a third factor, polite culture which formed a new public
sphere; society was expected to produce and improve public opinion
and civic virtue through social discipline in which people were
approving and disapproving each other's sentiments and behaviours.
Scottish moral philosophers adopted Christian Stoicism to reform
education in university and church. I will examine how they tried to
reconcile virtue with religion. Their ideal of politeness included
refinement of sentiments and manners, toleration, a free inquiry and
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conversation. These did not necessarily deny the deity's existence or
providence, yet they required considerable modification of Augustinian
outlook of human nature. In the orthodox doctrine of Presbyterianism
virtue suitable for corrupt human nature was humility and private
conscience was under God's immediate discipline. So for orthodox
people Stoic self-discipline would seem a vice of pride and social
discipline by spectatorial relations would seem dependence. The
Westminster Confession regarded human nature as helpless without
grace because of 'original corruption, whereby we are utterly
indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined
to all evil.'20)Catechism contained moral law only 'to convince them [all
men] their disability to keep it.'21'In its extreem form Presbyterian
liberty of private conscience could degenerate into intolerance, and
spiritual and moral values were supposed to be realized exclusively in
the city of God.
Secular moral philosophy might be considered as a pursuit of
self-control in society through polite culture. Into early eighteenth-
century Scotland came English Augustan culture represented by
Shaftesbury's philosophy and Addison and Steel's journalism so that
many Scots took interest in polite tastes and manners as an important
means of national moral improvemnet.221 Reconstruction of moral
philsosphy for politeness was under way in main universities even
before Hutcheson's inauguration in Glasgow in 1730. Though often
assumed to be the father of the Scottish Enlightenment, he was rather
among Scottish moralists in the contexts of English influence on them
and Irish Presbyterians' and republicans' exchange of ideas with them.
George Turnbull lectured on moral philosophy as science of man in
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Marischal College, Aberdeen as early as in 1721-27.231 He thought that
'religion and virtue are one and the same thing,' and replaced
enthusiasm with sociability: 'when one abandones the world to give
himself up to religious contemplation, mankind being naturally made for
social exercise and communication with one another in many acts of
benevolence and friendship, the right balance of the mind will be
lost:'241Stoic tranquility which enthusiasm destroyed would be regained
by social affections.
Hutcheson dedicated his moral philosophy to education of his
students and citizens in Glasgow so that they would refine their moral
sentiments. He revealed his intention: 'I hope I am contributing to
promote the more moderate and charitable sentiments in religious
matters in this country, where there yet remains too much warmth and
animosity about matters of no great consequence to real religion. We
must make allowance for the power of education and have indulgence
to the weakness of our brethren.'251In his inauguration address he
criticized both Epicurian self-love theory of Hobbes and Pufendorf's
theory of sociability derived from rational calculation of self-interest,
and expounded Stoic natural sociability of man whose essence was
benevolence. Thereby he tried to change the moral foundation for
Pufendorf's account of duties, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, which
was adopted as a text of moral philosophy in Scottish universities.
Though virtuous human nature was not consistent with fallen state in
the church orthodoxy, Hutcheson, while admitting the present depravity
of man, turned to 'the original structure of our nature' before sin; he
found there 'that moral sense that we also call natural conscience' and
identified it with the Stoic ruling principle.In this way he tried to avoid
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antagonism with 'Protestant theologians'26'.So in his Christian Stoicism
self-control was a recovery of the original structure of human nature
instituted by the deity.
Hutcheson's eloquent lecture on virtue fascinated many students as
is shown by their often quoted appreciative remarks. But his ethics and
natural theology were not congenial to devout presbyteries strong in the
western regions of Scotland, and he was prosecuted, though unsuc-
cessfully, by Glasgow Presbytery for violating the Westminster
Confession in 1737. The next year saw a pamphlet by an alleged
ex-student who had been almost captivated by Hutheson's account of
virtue and the moral sense but realized his deviation from Christianity.
His apprehension of Hutcheson's influence through his disciples now in
the important positions of the church may be an evidence of his wide
popularity. Hutcheson was denounced as a Shaftesburian deist in eleven
points: for instance, the possibility of understanding the good and bad
without the knowledge of God; the moral standard not in God's law
but in the tendency to promote others' happiness; subjection of the
church to 'the temporal good of the State'; 'an absolute unlimited
Toleration of all Manners of Doctrines that are not directly inconsistent
with the publick Tranquility'.27'Some disciples of Hutcheson replied to
this pamphlet, arguing that an enemy of Christianity was rather 'a
Spirit of Persecution' and that he was not a deist but put religion on
the firm foundation of morality.28'
Hutcheson was denounced by the Presbytery partly because he
taught ordianry citizens Christianity in Sunday school outside the church
institution. This teaching shows his intention to make Christianity open
to laymen's discussion. His text was Grotius's The Truth of the
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Christian Religion. Grotius wanted to recover peace and unity among
Christians by this apologetics without dogmas. For this purpose he
chose to explain a few unifying common truths of Christianity to
persuade outsiders as he stated, 'I contrive to motivate atheists,
heathens, Jews and Moslems to acknowledge that Christianity is the
true religion.'29'This tolerant religion of humanist tradition was just
what Hutcheson tried to revive. This type of Christianity is reconcilable
with ancient moral philosophy: 'There is the less Reason for the
Heathens to oppose the Christian Religion, because all the parts of it
are so agreeable to the Rules of Virtue.'30' Furthermore some
improvement of ancient morality may be found in this religion;
presumably modern private liberty will be better secured in Christian
humanity than in Pagan military and political virtues and 'those Vices,
which under a Shew of Virtue deceived many of the Greeks and
Romans, viz, the Desire of Honour and Glory'.31'Another advantage of
Christinaity may be the concept of the furute reward as the end of
man or the greatest good for him. This would supersede the opposition
between Stoic virtue as happiness and Epicurean sensual pleasure. The
future happiness reconciles virtue and sensibility and helps us to get a
tranquil mind.32'
Hutcheson's commitment to Christian Stoicism as moral education
is shown by Marcus Aurelius's Meditations translated by him and
James Moor. They insisted on finding true piety and virtue in this
heathen philosopher and contrasted his small persecution of Christians
with greater sectarian persecution among Christians in their introduction
and read 'providence' into 'nature' in many translated passages.33' In
Stoicism universal harmony is supposed to be reflected in human
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nature and Hutcheson seems to have been interested in how to
preserve that harmony by self-control. Marcus Aurelius's advice is to
'CULTIVATE with all care that power which forms opinions: all
depends on this'.34'Control of opinions leads to restraint of fancy and
Hutcheson remarked in a note: 'This examination of the images of
fancy, so often mentioned by Antonius, is one of the most excellent
means for preserving puriety of mind.'35' Distinguishing between some
apparent good and the real value requires the notion of the supreme
good, which we will see later in Hutcheson's textbook of moral
philosophy.
Many Scottish moral philosophers pursued virtue by way of
Christian Stoicism which they expected to reform education supervised
by the church without clashing with it. But Hutchesone's advocacy of
polite culture did not always enjoy favourable responses from his
contemporary Scots. Some thinkers maintained traditional Christian
morals on the basis of self-love, denying natural sociability and virtue.
Alexander Forbes referred mainly to French Augustinian moralists and
expounded ethics of two kinds of enlightened self-love: either self-love
can be enlightened by necessity of reciprocity of offices for satisfying
our needs to lead us to socially beneficial actions; or self-love can be
turned to love of God which the divine grace helps to achieve virtue as
he mentioned 'the Capacity of being transformed into a new Nature by
the Power of God, or what is call'd Grace'.36'He outlined the history of
arguments about virtue from Stoics vs. Epicurians to Shaftesbury vs.
La Rochefoucauld and Bayle and remarked that Shaftesbury's 'calm
benevolence' and 'self-approbation' were the same as 'the cool deliberate
selfishness'. His Christian outlook of man was opposed to Hutcheson's;
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'Stoical old-fashion'd Pride has been of late dress'd up into a kind of
System, by which the defective Nature of Man... and the whole visible
Creation, are represented as quite free of Imperfection and Evil... such
a strange Representation of the Excelency of human Nature, as to
reject all Necessity of a Mediator, Revelation, and the continual
Influence of the Divine Spirit on the impure fallibleSpirits of Men,...'37>
Thus criticizing what he called 'a modern Heathenism', remarkably he
recommended 'deceny' as an alternative to morality based on virtue and
law based on self-interest. Decency is observed because of our
sentiments of shame and remorse and he found sociality of selfishness:
we have 'a Desire of the Approbation of others' which derives from
our persuasion of the dignity of human being.38'In fact we need to
know and approve ourselves to exist, but we can not do so without
spectatorial others, in whose place we put ourselves in imagination for
self-approval, so others are essential for our self. He seems to have
grasped this and opposed it to the Stoic concept of independence as he
said that 'we must often have the Approbation of others, in order to
reconcile us to ourselves... pure independent Self-sufficiency is not a
natural state of Mind'.39) Forbes may show a Scottish climate of opinion
in which modern detail analyses of human psychology were decon-
structing the Stoic ideal of self-control, and politeness tended to be
considered in terms of decency without virtue. Hutcheson may have
perceived a moral crisisin this climate and replied to it.
Archibald Campbell, a disciple of Simson and professor of
ecclesiastical history in the University of St. Andrews, tried to explain
Hutchesonian virtue in terms of self-love. His concept of self-love has
nothing inconsistent with benevolence because, as he argued, self-love
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is expressed as the desire of esteem, which prompts us to mutual
benevolence and offices.401If self-love is to be a principle of virtue,
self-love must be put in social relations and self must be self reflected
in others' view. For him Hutcheson's idea of self-love was too confined
and Mandeville's idea of virtue was too rigid; if taken in the right
meaning, self-love should be the foundation of virtue. While presup-
posing self-love, Campbell rejected Hobbes's state of nature, combining
self-love with sociability;'a mutual Intercourse of kind Affections and
Actions' causes natural society before the establishment of political
society.411He was an eclectic, referring to an enormous number of
ancient philosophers, whom he thought of as instructive to prospective
ministers. His appreciation of the ancient moral philosophy in the
education of ministers is shown by his statement: 'I pretend to account
for Moral Virtue from heathen Philosophers... next to the holy
Scripture, moral Philosophy ought to be the main Study of a Christian
Divine.'42'He regarded the church mainly as an institution of moral
education as he said, 'Isit not owing to the Gospel of Jesus Christ that
everywhere throughout the Christian world, in towns and villages, and
all over the country, churches, or as one may justly call them, public
schools, are erected wherein public teachers are employed to train up
mankind without distinction in the knowledge of their duty and to
persuade them to the life and practice of all righteousness?'431 But,
unlike Hutcheson, he interpreted the account of duties of Cicero,
Seneca, Antonius and others as self-love theory. In fact he mentioned
Cicero as making self-interest the moral standard when he criticized
Hutcheson: 'very selfish is Tully, that he expressly directs us to express
our Love, and regulates our Beneficence towards others by this very
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Standard.'441
Hutcheson found a comrade in education reform in William
Wishart, a principal of the College of Edinburgh, who was influenced
by Shaftesbury, Molesworth, Butler as well as Hutcheson. He was
convinced that 'there is such a disposition of Benevolence or a social
affection in Human Nature, independent of all deliberate views of
self-interest'45'and that Christianity was a religion promoting this
benevolence. He was a moral realist, criticizing Sceptics and Epi-
curians: there is a distinction between moral good and evil prior to law,
and man has a faculty for perceiving it. This was called 'Sense of
Beauty and Deformity in Life and Manners' or 'Conscience'.46'Later, in
reply to orthodox Augustinians, he distinguished 'the natural Sense of
Goodness' and 'a natural Inclination to Goodness',4" and thereby tried to
reconcile the faculty of moral perception with corrupt human nature.
As the faculty enables man to keep a due balance among the passions
and obtain happiness, it is a foundation of Stoic self-control. Moreover
we can say that this moral faculty underpins freedom of conscience. He
was a keen advocate of freedom of private judgement as 'the natural
and unalienable Rights'. This freedom was based on the Lockean
distinction between the sphere of political power and the religious
sphere of private judgement: 'a free choice is the very soul of it
[religion]' and civil magistrates should not interfere by punishment to
enforce church authority.481Before public opinion came to be justified as
autonomous and critical of the public authority of church and state,
probably it was necessary that each private opinion should be examined
and selected by the moral faculty. Wishart was persuaded that 'Opinion
is allin all',referring to Shaftesbury's quotation of Marcus Aurelius.491
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So Stoic self-control was related to freedom of speech. The practical
application of his moral philosophy was education reform, and in his
view corruption among the youth was not due to corruption in human
nature, but to the neglect of 'a rational and virtuous Education':
university education was teaching 'shibboleth of a Party' so that social
affections were checked while selfish passions encouraged.50' This moral
critique of the church superintending education caused a reaction from
orthodox churchmen. In one pamphlet Wishart's 'polite Way of
Preaching' was regarded as non-Christian education relying on
Shaftesbury rather than the Bible and 'the good old Way' of the
Confession of Faith and Catechism was recommended against 'this
refined and polite Age'.5" Christian Stoicism may have looked like a
chimera in the orthodox eyes and the two components were severed
and contrasted. While the church authority was defensive, admitting
the trend towards the Enlightenment, it tried to preserve the Scottish
Presbyterian tradition as a distinctive field from permeating secular
culture of politeness. The critique of Hutcheson and Wishart in the
1730s seemingly prefigured in a number of ways a later development of
the Popular and Evangelical critiques of the Moderates, of which the
most famous was John Witherspoon's Ecclesiastical Characteristics
(1753)
While providing the public with a model of noble sentiments by
translating Marcus Aurelius, Hutcheson wrote a university textbook,
Philosophiae Moralis Institutio Compendiara (1745), which was a
summary of his moral philosophy of Stoic reconstruction for moral
education. It may be said that he tried to explain the Stoic practical
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morality and education by having recourse to modern epistemology and
analysis of passions and to make Stoic self-discipline compatible with
the pursuit of happiness by adding Christian outlook of providence.
Stoic ethics has, as he noticed, a distinction between duty and virtue:
the former concerns the external actions for the pursuit of interests and
is related to natural law; and the latter concerns the culture of
benevolent affections and the supreme good. The former is morally
indifferent and the latter is essential for a perfect system of ethics. But
his contemporary moral philosophy tended to regard only the former as
Cicero's and Pufendorf's influential books on duties.52' So, while
Hutcheson's system of moral philosophy was mainly constructed on the
Pufendorfian model of natural laws and rights which surely gave him a
more democratic tendency than Shaftesbury, the fundamental part by
which he wanted to improve moral philosophy seems to have been
ethics covering virtues and the supreme good. While he referred his
students to Grotius, Pufendorf, Cumberland, Barbeyrac, Locke,
Harrington, Shaftesbury and Carmichael in further reading, he
suggested that they should 'Go to the grand fountains of all the
sciences, of all elegance; the inventers and improvers of all ingenious
arts, the Greek and Roman writers: and ... have recourse also to yet
purer fountains, the holy Scriptures'.531This may suggest that Stoic and
Christian languages should be picked up from among languages forming
his moral philosophy, such as natural jurisprudence and civic
humanism.
In his early works Hutcheson formulated the human faculty of
moral perception. Using Lockean epistemology he traced moral
approval to the perception of an idea of virtue by the moral sense,
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which could not be reduced to the rational deliberation of self-interest.
Finding the moral faculty in the sense is naturally contrary to Stoicism,
according to which all the senses should be controlled by the ruling
principle of reason. But partial particularity of passions compelled him
to adopt reason in his account of 'general calm desires'.54*It is an
accepted interpretation that he tended to identify the moral sense as
reason or conscience partly because he was influenced by Christian
Stoicism of Butler, who observed that Shaftesbury's view of virtue was
defective in failing to consider conscience or reflection.55'Thus his
theory of the moral sense was incorporated into the Stoic self-control.
He remarked that 'to regulate the highest powers of our nature, our
affections and deliberate designs of action in important affairs, there's
implanted by nature the noblest and most divine of all our senses, that
Conscience by which we discern what is graceful, becoming, beautiful
and honourable in the affections of the soul, in our conduct of life, our
words and actions.'56'This shows that his theory of virtue presupposed
a priori belief of the moral aim of the humanity constituted by the
divinity. His persistence in this Christian Stoic assumption was probably
a reaction to Hume's theoretically superior scepticism in his Treatise of
Human Nature which they discussed in their correspondence.5T)
It seems that Hutcheson, on the one hand, opened a new
perspective by introducing modern epistemology and social psychology
into Stoic ethics and, on the other hand, defended the central belief of
Christian Stoicism from Hume's devastating scepticism. Hutcheson's
significant contribution might be his considering morality in terms of
our perception and approval of virtue. As people with this faculty
naturally try to understand with approval' or disapproval each other's
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affections, the study of moral perception leads to the study of social
relations. Then morality is seen to be formed among people mutually
approving and disapproving, not necessarily dictated by God to man.
Since Stoic independence will hardly be practical in modern society in
which people are interdependent with necessary commerce of
sentiments, offices and goods, independence must be reconceptualized
to be consistent with modern sociability.This is just what Shaftesbury
intended to achieve with his new concept of politeness.58'It might be
said that Hutcheson also tried to change Stoicism into ethics of modern
society by working out self-discipline through sociable sensibility.
Self-approval and self-disapproval require detachment from self and
putting self in a spectator's place. Each in reality achieves this ability
to judge oneself after each judges and communicates with the other
until some standard of approval is shared. Thus rises 'intersubjectivity
of moral judgement'.59' Without sociability the moral sense may remain
subjective. Prejudice, custom, education and fanaticism sometimes
corrupt the moral sense, yet it will be cured of such partialityif put in
extensive spectatorial relations.
So sociability proves to be a way to moral improvement, and
Hutcheson is criticalof Stoic indiference, saying that 'That must be a
very fantastick Scheme of Virtue, which represents it as a private
sublimely selfish Discipline, to preserve our selves wholly unconcerned,
not only in the Changes of Fortune as to our Wealth or Poverty,
Liberty or Slavery, Ease or Pain, but even in all external Events
whatsoever, in the Fortunes of our dearest Friends or Country, solacing
our selves that we are easy and undisturbed.'60'His critique of Stoicism
as remodelling the divine constitution of human nature may have been
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influenced by Malebranche's appreciation of sociable passions.
Malebranche's 'science of man' consisted in experimental analysis of the
passions and he showed an almost Humean understanding of the
extensive power of the passions and rejected Stoic pride because 'itis
rediculous to philosophize against experience.'611 Hutcheson developed
Malebranche's analysis of the passions and distinguished and balanced
private and public passions, instead of denying them all. Generous
affections and sympathy prove sociability of human nature and natural
disposition to moderation and self-control. Besides the moral sense/con-
science and benevolence, he found the sense of honour and shame to
restrain selfishness effectively in social relations. An independent and
indifferent person would not mind at all his honour and shame, so he
may suffer enthusiasm. The idea of moral discipline became so
extensive as to include sociability as a means of it. Politeness might be
understood as a modification of Stoic self-discipline with the recognition
of a sociable constitution of human self; the reciprocity of spectatorial
moral approval/disapproval through free conversation helps us to
improve our moral potential to attain the perfect virtue of impartial
benevolence. Moral significance of sociability was remarked also by
Butler, who stated that 'to have no restraint from, no regard to, others
in our behaviour is the speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as
single and independent, as having nothing in our nature which has
respect to our fellow creature, reduced to action and practice.'621
In Hutcheson's synthesis of the Stoic language and the modern
language of sensibility self-control was put in the social relations of
free communication among equal citizens, yet it stillrequired not only
'frequent impartial meditation' on human nature631 but the Christian
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Stoic hierarchical order of values for the restraint of fanciful opinions.
Hutcheson searched for the supreme good by classifying human
pleasures by their dignity and duration. His division is: 1. sensual
pleasures, 2. pleasures of beauty, 3. pleasures of sympathy, 4. pleasures
of virtue, 5. pleasures of piety. Corrupt opinions are due to the
association of ideas which puts an idea of some higher pleasure on
some lower one.64)Priority given to piety and virtue proves him to have
been a Christian Stoic moralist with belief in the divine creation of man
for the definite purposes. Providence is an essential security for keeping
moderation and self-control when adversity threatens to discourage
moral virtue and sociability. Noticing 'the instable condition of
terrestrial affairs' and 'the weakness and inconstancy of human
virtues', Hutcheson envisaged the future end of history in which the
humanity and the states would perish and the eternal happiness would
be realized by the divine grace.65'In the general framework of his
moral philosophy society and morality did not supersede religion but the
city of God remained the ulfimate goal, so in this respect he remaind
Augustinian.
Though situated within this Augustinian limitation, civil society
was morally worthwhile on its own in this limitation of mortality in
Hutcheson's system. In society opinions were disciplined both by social
education of polite culture and by government instruction; he wanted
civil magistrates 'to instillinto the minds of their subjects the true
sentiments of religion and virtue' as well as to preserve their
property.661 This promotion of self-control by government may be
compared with neo-Stoicism's connection with absolutism. The main
point of Neo-Stoicism was that self-control was useful to reason of
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state for providing obedient subjects and securing a peaceful order. As
Hutcheson's ideological intention was clearly not the defence of
absolutism but that of revolution, the emphasis of his Stoicism was put
on self-control through social relations among private persons so that
any restraint by government's force would become irrelevant. In fact he
referred to Epictetus's epigram: 'Choose rather to correct your own
passions, than to be corrected and punished on their account.'671 We
may say, therefore, that self-control and toleration were essential for
each other. Polite culture which Hutcheson and other Scots introduced,
synthesizing Stoicism of self-discipline and moral psychology of sociable
passions, was forming a new moral sphere of society besides church
and state.
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